

**SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS:  
NEITHER EVOLUTION NOR DEVOLUTION – IMPASSE**

**Max G. Manwaring**

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## Report Documentation Page

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## FOREWORD

This monograph comes at a time of promise for greater economic integration between the United States and Latin America, but also one of profound concern about the deteriorating security situation in several countries in the region. Importantly, the benefits of stability, economic growth, and democracy depend on effective national sovereignty and security. These realities are gaining credence as we grow to understand that Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state, and that has enormous implications for the well-being of the Western Hemisphere. Yet, no consensus on the threat and how to deal with it has emerged. As a consequence, hemispheric security cooperation is at an impasse.

In this context, Dr. Max Manwaring identifies the political-strategic challenge of effective sovereignty and security, with a focus on nontraditional threats. He recommends that leaders rethink the problem of nontraditional threats and develop the conceptual and strategic-political multilateral responses necessary to deal effectively with them. Piecemeal tactical-operational level responses to nontraditional threats and actors must be supplemented by broader strategic-political efforts. Also, cooperative national and international efforts designed to inhibit and reverse the processes of state failure must supplement military and law-enforcement emphasis on the attrition of individual “narco-terrorists.”

Dr. Manwaring’s recommendations constitute no easy task. However, if the United States and the other countries of the hemisphere ignore what is happening in Latin America, the expansion of terrorism, “lawless areas,” and general instability easily could destroy the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that has been achieved. That would profoundly affect the health of the U.S. economy—and the concomitant power to act in the global security arena. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this important and timely monograph as a part of the ongoing debate on security cooperation in the Americas.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.  
Director  
Strategic Studies Institute



## PREFACE

Professor Max Manwaring, in this persuasive essay, reminds us that security issues in the Western Hemisphere demand more attention from Washington than they often get and, importantly, a different kind of attention. Indeed, he invites collective Washington to stretch its mind, broaden its horizons, and accept a more holistic view (realistic, he would contend) of what national security really means in 2004.

The stakes, he argues, are high. Preoccupied as the United States is with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), often treating “terrorism” as if it were a single enemy rather than a means to an end, this country loses sight of the overall risk of cross-border instability caused by failing states. Some of them are in the Western Hemisphere. That is too close to home, a threat we can ill afford.

An important circle of linkages which Manwaring wants us to consider is the interdependence among security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty (the last term including the notion of legitimacy). That linkage is not lost in our hemisphere, of course. This monograph was written looking forward to the “Special Summit of the Americas” in Monterrey, Mexico, in mid-January 2004. The agenda responds to major Latin American concerns,<sup>1</sup> and to Manwaring’s invitation to planners to look beyond the present levels of analysis of Western Hemisphere security issues.

Nevertheless, as he warns us, some “sticking points” keep North-South relations from being harmonious. Latin Americans, despite recognizing their own security and financial problems, are loath to take directions from Washington. On the eve of the Special Summit, certain leaders (Kirchner, Fox, and Chavez, among others) had publicly bristled at various comments from Washington about such matters as their relations with Fidel Castro and their financial restructuring. Moreover, Washington is still perceived as focused principally on drug trafficking and “narco-terrorism,” while Latins want to discuss its fault lines of security and stability which are mainly economic and social.

Not all the news from Latin America is bad, of course. In January, dramatic gains by Colombia’s government against the insurgent

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) included the capture of Ricardo Palmera (aka Simón Trinidad), considered the fourth-ranking man in that organization.<sup>2</sup> Such a move will reinforce the will of the U.S. Congress to continue its aid to Colombia and to support President Alvaro Uribe. The gains are also evidence of increasing regional cooperation with Colombia, according to Professor Manwaring's War College colleague, Colonel Joseph R. Núñez. Denying the FARC the ability to hide in "ungoverned spaces," says Núñez, is essential; yet cooperation is still not good with Hugo Chavez's Venezuela.<sup>3</sup>

Such gains, however, certainly do not contradict Manwaring's warning that Colombia is the "paradigm of a failing state." In fact, a recent study released by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York criticizes the U.S. policy on "Drugs and Thugs" in the Andean region, saying that it cannot possibly achieve the stated U.S. goals of democracy, prosperity and security. The report, as does Manwaring, argues for a far broader approach.<sup>4</sup>

The "ultimate threat" of state failure, Manwaring tells us, is a Pandora's box of instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism, a spectrum of ills which flow well beyond the failed state's borders. But, he points out, we don't have to wait for the state to fail. The process itself, which we can already see in many instances, profoundly is destabilizing. Until there is common agreement on the threat, though, he says, things will be at an impasse. What is called for is "the highest level of strategic-political thought." If Manwaring is right, we had better not wait too long for it.<sup>5</sup>

Ambler Moss  
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## ENDNOTES-PREFACE

1. The stated purpose of the summit was to engage the themes of Economic Growth with Equity, Social Development, and Democratic Governance.
1. See *The Economist*, January 10, 2004.
2. *Financial Times*, January 9, 2004.
3. Council on Foreign Relations, *Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region*, December 2003. The report was prepared by a high-level commission of experts from the private sector, civil society and academia.
4. A similar clarion call is expressed by former diplomat Chester A. Crocker and now James R. Schlesinger, Professor of Strategic Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, in "Engaging Failed States," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 5, September-October 2003.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING holds the General Douglas MacArthur Chair and is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College. He has served in various civilian and military positions, including at the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author and coauthor of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs, democratization and global ungovernability, and Latin American security affairs. He is also the editor or coeditor of *El Salvador at War; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations; Deterrence in the 21st Century; and The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*. Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. in Political Science, an M.A. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

## SUMMARY

This monograph begins with a discussion of sovereignty and then considers national security threats with reference to two different levels of analysis. The first is the traditional-legal versus a more realistic contemporary level of analysis; second, the operational, strategic, and political levels of analysis. The traditional concept tends to focus attention on the tactical-operational levels of activity; the more contemporary notion broadens analysis to more strategic-political concerns.

In these strategic-political terms, it is useful to outline the circular linkage among and between security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty. This linkage clarifies the interdependence of these elements, and provides beginning points from which to develop the strategic-political vision necessary for success against the most likely current and future security challenges and threats at the international, national, and intra-national levels. In that context, two case studies are examined: Colombia over the past 40 to 50 years, and the “New War” in Central America; toward an understanding of how Colombia, Central America, and their U.S. ally have dealt with nontraditional threats to national security, stability, and sovereignty in their respective situations. The Central American case focuses on the traditional versus the more modern approach, and the Colombian case centers on the tactical versus the strategic approach to the problem. These cases further illustrate that instability, and the people who create and/or exploit it, are tactical-operational threats in their own right. But, the ultimate political-strategic threat to more general hemispheric and global security and sovereignty is that of state failure.

The author concludes with the argument that a broadened concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful and important. This is particularly crucial for those governments in the Western Hemisphere—and elsewhere—that do not discern any serious security issues, or proverbial clouds, on their traditionally defined peaceful horizons. Ample evidence indicates that nontraditional security problems can take nation-states to a process

that ends in failing or failed state status—as examples, dysfunctional states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new “peoples’ democracies.” Moreover, it is important to note that failing and failed states tend not to (1) buy U.S. and other Western-made products; (2) be interested in developing democratic and free market institutions and human rights; and, (3) cooperate on shared problems such as illegal drugs, illicit arms flows, debilitating refugee flows, and potentially dangerous environmental problems (e.g., water scarcity). In short, failing and failed states tend to linger, and go from bad to worse. The longer they persist, the more they and their problems endanger global peace and security.

# SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS: NEITHER EVOLUTION NOR DEVOLUTION—IMPASSÉ

## INTRODUCTION

Contemporary security and stability are fragile in the Western Hemisphere. As a corollary, an insecure and unstable hemisphere threatens regional national security and sovereignty, regional economic and socio-political development, U.S. security, and, ultimately, global stability. Those challenges or threats are exacerbated by “spill-over” problems from the crisis generated by Colombia’s three wars (i.e., narco-terrorism, insurgency, and paramilitary vigilantism), and by global terrorism. These threats are gaining credence, as it is generally recognized that Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state that has enormous implications for the prosperity, stability, democracy, and peace of the Western Hemisphere.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, two sticking-points arise in the hemispheric security dialogue regarding risks for Colombia and the world around it—and what the United States and the region can do cooperatively to deal with them. First, general agreement appears to exist that there is a need to go beyond U.S.-mandated, myopic, ad hoc, piecemeal, tactical-operational, and primarily military solutions to the so-called “drug war” and/or “narco-terrorism.” Moreover, Latin American countries perceive that the United States is going its own way in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and is oblivious to the more strategic nonmilitary problems in Latin America and the Caribbean that spawn illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, and myriad human and other destabilizers leading to crime, corruption, violence, and conflict. Thus, a tendency to reject U.S. domination, and leadership and solutions exists.<sup>2</sup>

The second sticking-point is that no consensus on the “threat” has emerged. The security dialogue indicates strong consensus on a strategic vision of peace, stability, security, prosperity, and civil society for the entire Western Hemisphere. But, with no agreement on the threat, there can be no agreement on a unified ends-ways-

means policy and strategy that could contribute directly to achieving that strategic vision. The problem of threat appears to revolve around the levels of analysis issue. The legal-traditional level of analysis defines national security and sovereignty in relatively narrow military terms. Generally it involves the protection of the “nation” against conventional military aggression by another country. A nontraditional and more realistic concept of threat goes beyond conventional external aggression to the protection of national security and sovereignty against internal and nonstate destabilizers.<sup>3</sup>

The impasse generated by these sticking points is complicated further by a general desire in the Latin American and Caribbean communities to devolve the responsibility for hemispheric security and security cooperation to the Organization of American States (OAS). That is logical because it is well-understood that today’s security and stability requirements call for a coordinated and cooperative multilateral application of national civilian and military instruments of power. The OAS can provide a moral position and structural framework from which member states can operate together when necessary and separately when desired. Yet, the OAS is not known for its interest in security matters, or the speed with which it deals with them.<sup>4</sup>

One reason for this lack of movement is that, without a consensus on the threat and the ways and means of dealing with it, an additional major complication to the threat issue exists. That is, most OAS member nations are reluctant to take the broadened “realist” definition of national security to its logical conclusion and correspondingly broaden the role of the military to a controversial unilateral and multilateral protection of peoples and governments. This is a serious civil-military relations issue in much of Latin America, because a well-founded concern is that some military institutions of the region might revert to past practices of acting as parallel and autonomous political actors superior to the civil political power. As a consequence, the hemispheric security cooperation concept remains at an impasse, and the countries of the hemisphere continue to deal with it—if at all—separately.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, this monograph begins with a discussion of sovereignty (i.e., the supreme power over a body politic), and then of national

security threats with reference to two different levels of analysis. First, the traditional-legal versus a more realistic contemporary level of analysis; and, second, the operational, strategic, and political levels of analysis. Interestingly and importantly, the traditional concept tends to focus attention on the tactical-operational levels of activity, and the more contemporary notion broadens analysis to more strategic-political concerns.<sup>6</sup>

In these strategic-political terms, it is useful to outline the circular linkage among security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty. This linkage will clarify the interdependence of these elements, and will provide beginning points from which to develop the strategic-political vision necessary for success against the most likely current and future security challenges at the international, national, and intra-national levels. In that context, the author examines two case studies: Colombia over the past 40 to 50 years, and the “New War” in Central America. He intends to illustrate how Colombia, Central America, and their U.S. ally have dealt with nontraditional threats to national security, stability, and sovereignty in their respective situations. The Central American case will focus on the traditional versus the more modern approach, and the Colombian case will center on the tactical versus the strategic approach to the problem. Additionally, these cases further define the ultimate contemporary threat to more general hemispheric security and effective sovereignty.

The monograph concludes with the argument that a broadened concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful and important. That, in turn, leads to a call for a paradigm change. This is particularly important for those governments in the Western Hemisphere—and elsewhere—that do not discern any serious security issues, or clouds, on their peaceful horizons. These realities of the contemporary and future global security environments call for civilian and military leaders to reexamine the problems of threat, cooperative civil-military relations, and effective sovereignty before they resolve themselves. Ample evidence demonstrates that nontraditional security problems can lead nation-states to failing or failed state status;<sup>7</sup> as examples, dysfunctional states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new “peoples’ democracies.”

## PART ONE: THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS PROBLEM

The Western mainstream, legally-oriented security dialogue demonstrates that many political and military leaders and scholars of international relations have not yet adjusted to the reality that internal and transnational nonstate actors can be as important as traditional nation-states in determining global political patterns and outcomes in world affairs. Similarly, many political leaders see nonstate actors as bit players on the international stage. At most, many consider these nontraditional actors to be low-level law enforcement problems, and, as a result, many argue that these political actors do not require sustained national security policy attention.<sup>8</sup> Yet, more than half the countries in the world are struggling to maintain their political, economic, and territorial integrity in the face of diverse direct and indirect nonstate (including criminal) challenges.<sup>9</sup> The resultant impasse regarding “threat” to national security and effective sovereignty—and how to deal with it—revolves around the levels of analysis issue.

To understand just how such a threat can exist—and that it must be dealt with both conceptually and practically—we need to comprehend the context in which it operates. Thus, this section briefly will examine: 1) the traditional and more modern concepts of the threat to national security and sovereignty; 2) the linkage among security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty; 3) the levels of analysis issue in the Colombian and Central American cases; (4) some additional implications; and 5) the ultimate threat.

### **Traditional and More Modern Concepts of Threat to National Security and Sovereignty.**

Again, the legal-traditional concept of threat to national security involves the protection of national sovereignty against external military aggression.<sup>10</sup> National sovereignty tends to be defined as the integrity of national borders and national interests at home and possibly abroad. The enemy is, thus, a traditional nation-state, with recognizable military formations, that violates national borders and threatens the major institutions and perhaps natural resources and external interests of the state. In these terms, the enemy includes

the specific military formations involved and the industrial-technical ability of the aggressor state to support the military attack materially. A related concept of threat to national security involves “strategic access” and “strategic denial.” That is, maintaining a traditional nation-state’s access to sea lines of communication, markets, resources, bases, choke points, or other specific strategic assets or denying another traditional nation-state access to specified assets or interests.<sup>11</sup> In any case, the traditional level of analysis tends to define threats to national security in relatively narrow nation-state and military terms.

The more realistic contemporary nontraditional security dialogue tends to focus on enhancing real and popular perceptions of relative stability and well-being. Stability and well-being tend to refer to the use of a variety of means—only one of which is military—in the pursuit of political and economic objectives. In turn, enemies can be traditional nation-states, nontraditional external nonstate actors or proxies, or violent nontraditional intra-state actors that might threaten the achievement of those objectives and the vitality of the state. As a result, the enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military entity or has an industrial/technical capability to make war. At base, the enemy now becomes the individual political actor that plans and implements the kind of violence which threatens national well-being and exploits the root causes of instability.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, the entire international community will inevitably face horrible new dilemmas at home and abroad that arise from the chaos engendered in the contemporary global security environment. The threat of devastating attacks by *anyone* controlling nuclear weapons retains credibility. At the same time, the threat of biological and chemical war and cyber war intensify. At a lower level on the likelihood ladder of warfare as a whole, conventional military attack also retains certain credibility. But, more important, according to General (Ret.) Michael P. C. Carns,

These challenges to stability and well-being are gravely complicated by threats and menaces emanating from rogue states, substate and transnational terrorists, insurgents, illegal drug traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, militant fundamentalists, ethnic cleansers, and 1,000 other “snakes” with a cause—and the will to conduct asymmetrical warfare [to achieve their own political objectives].<sup>13</sup>

Many of these kinds of attacks challenge the traditional definition of a threat to national security. As one example, terrorism in much of the world and in most of the Western Hemisphere is defined as a serious criminal phenomenon, but a crime nevertheless.<sup>14</sup> Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States and some of its allies have begun to emphasize terrorism as a serious threat to national security and meaningful sovereignty.<sup>15</sup> In these terms, it is helpful to examine the linkage among security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty. This operational, strategic, and political level analysis will establish two things: it will clarify that some issues now considered to be singular law enforcement problems are threats to the nation as we know it; and, it will provide a foundation for a reexamination of nontraditional security and stability threats to national security and sovereignty, and their implications for contemporary civil-military relations in Latin America.

### **The Linkage among Security, Stability, Development, Democracy, and Sovereignty.**

Finding solutions to the problems of security, stability, and well-being in the current global arena takes the international community or individual intervening actors beyond providing some form of humanitarian assistance in cases of human misery and need. It takes international political powers beyond traditional monitoring of bilateral agreements or protecting a people from another group of people or from a government. It takes these actors beyond compelling one or more parties to a conflict to cease human rights abuses and other morally repugnant practices or repelling some form of conventional military aggression. Solutions to the problems of stability and well-being take us to five highly interrelated and reinforcing lessons that should have been learned by now.<sup>16</sup>

*The Relationship of Security to Stability.* As noted above, one influential nontraditional school of thought within the international security dialogue has been attempting to define national security as national and regional well-being since the end of World War II. More and more, that task appears to consist of two closely associated elements. First, security involves the defense of sovereignty

(defined as supreme power over a body politic) in an increasingly interdependent and aggressive world. Second, security depends on the continued and expanded building of a country's socioeconomic infrastructure (that is, the bases of well-being and stability). Essentially, security with stability is the deliberate socioeconomic development of a nation and the concomitant development of regional and global influence and power. The reasoning is straightforward; the level of development has a decisive bearing on preserving internal order and external peace and enhancing national well-being.

*The Relationship of Stability to Development.* In the past, the world generally provided economic and financial aid to developing countries under the assumption that personal and collective security and political development would automatically follow. That has not happened. Coherent long-term, multilevel, and multilateral capability-building measures must be designed to create and strengthen human and physical infrastructure. At the same time, these measures must generate the technical, professional, and ethical bases through which competent and honest political leadership can effectively provide individual and collective well-being. In the context of socioeconomic-political development, facilitated by the establishment of legitimate law and order, a governing regime can begin to develop sustainable peace and prosperity.

*The Relationship of Development to Democracy.* The relationship of development to democracy relies on legitimate governance or, in other words, responsible democracy. Legitimate governance is necessary to generate the capability to manage, coordinate, and sustain security, stability, and development effectively. This capability implies the competence and honesty to generate *responsible* democratic governance. This capability also implies the political competence to engender a national and international purpose to which a people can relate and support. Unless and until a population feels that its government deals with issues of personal security and socioeconomic-political development fairly and effectively, the potential for internal or external factors to destabilize and subvert a government is considerable. Regimes that ignore this lesson often find themselves in a “crisis of governance.” They face

increasing social violence, criminal anarchy, terrorism, insurgency, and overthrow.

*The Relationship of Democracy to Sovereignty.* Responsible democracy and political legitimacy are based upon the moral right of a government to govern and the ability of the regime to govern morally. Globally, popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, lack of upward social mobility, and lack of personal security tend to limit the right and the ability of governments to conduct the business of the state. As a government loses the right and ability to govern fairly and morally, it loses legitimacy. In turn, the loss of moral legitimacy leads to the degeneration of *de facto* state sovereignty. That is, the state no longer exercises effective control of the national territory and the people in it.

*From Sovereignty Back to Security.* Again, a fundamental societal requirement for acceptance and approval of state authority (sovereignty) is that a government must ensure individual and collective security. It begins with the provision of personal security of individual members of the citizenry. It then extends to protection of the collectivity from violent internal nonstate actors (including organized criminals and self-appointed vigilante groups) and external enemies—and, perhaps in some cases, from repressive internal (local and regional) governments. The security problem ends with the establishment of firm but fair control of the entire national territory and the people in it, which takes us back to the concept of sovereignty. That is, without complete control of the national territory, a government cannot provide the elements that define a more contemporary and meaningful concept of sovereignty: an effective judicial system, rule of law, or stability; long-term socioeconomic development; responsible democratic processes; sustainable peace.

### **The Levels of Analysis Issue from Two Cases: The Current Colombian Crisis and The “New War” in Central America.**

The Colombian and Central American cases are particularly good examples of the Levels of Analysis Problem. The intent herein

is to illustrate how each country and its U.S. ally has dealt with its respective “terrorism” or other “destabilizer” threat. Although there are elements of the traditional versus more contemporary and tactical versus strategic-political approaches in both cases, each case will focus on the different approaches. For example, the Colombian case will center on the tactical versus the strategic approach to the threat problems, and the Central American case will focus on the traditional approach. At the same time, these cases further define the ultimate threat to national security and meaningful sovereignty.

*An Example of the Tactical versus the Strategic Approach from the Current Colombian Case.* During the late 1960s through the 1980s, the illegal drug industry began to grow and prosper in Colombia’s unstable environment of virtually uncontrolled violence, rural poverty, political disarray, and government weakness. The prosperity of the drug industry, in turn, provided resources that allowed insurgent organizations to grow and expand. Later, as the Colombian government proved less and less effective in controlling the national territory and the people in it, the self-defense “vigilante” paramilitary groups emerged.<sup>17</sup> The thread that permitted these three violent internal nonstate actors to develop, grow, and succeed was—and is—adequate freedom of movement and action over time and space. The dynamics of this Hobbesian Trinity<sup>18</sup> of “narco-terrorists,” various insurgent organizations, primarily the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia* [FARC]) and paramilitary groups, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* [AUC]), have substantially expanded freedom of movement and action, and correspondingly eroded that of the state.<sup>19</sup> This case, then, is a point from which to examine the complexities of the “Colombian Crisis.” It is also a point from which to assess the generally tactical-operational levels of analysis that the Colombian government and its U.S. ally have applied to that situation and a point from which to compare the traditional idea of threat against a broader definition of threat to national security.

*Colombia’s Three Wars.* Colombia and its potential are deteriorating because of three ongoing, simultaneous, and interrelated wars involving the so-called “Hobbesian Trinity.” This unholy trinity of

internal nonstate actors, supported heavily by outside sources of funding, is perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality, human horror, and internal and external instability that, if left unchecked at the strategic and political levels, can ultimately threaten Colombia's survival as a sovereign democratic state and undermine the political stability and sovereignty of its neighbors. In that connection, there is now explicit recognition that Colombia's current situation has reached crisis proportions.<sup>20</sup>

*Stated Motives of the Narco-Insurgent-Paramilitary Nexus.* Each of the three violent nonstate players in the Colombian crisis separately generates formidable problems, challenges, and threats to the state and the region in its own right. What, then, of an alliance of the willing—even if that alliance represents a complicated mosaic of mutual and conflicting interests? The motives for the narco-insurgent-paramilitary nexus are straightforward. They are the accumulation of wealth, the control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy. Together, these elements represent usable power, power to allocate values and resources in a society.

Narcos may not seek the overthrow of the government as long as it is weak and can be controlled to allow them maximum freedom of movement and action.<sup>21</sup> The insurgents, on the other hand, seek the eventual destruction of the state as it now exists. Whether the insurgents are reformers or criminals is irrelevant. Their avowed objective is to take direct control of the government and the state.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, the paramilitaries want fundamental change. They seem to be interested in creating a strong state, capable of unquestioned enforcement of law and order. Whether the vigilante groups are “democratic” or authoritarian is also irrelevant. For their own self-preservation, they have little choice but to try to take direct or indirect control of the state.<sup>23</sup> In this sense, the nexus is not simply criminal in nature. It is a political-economic-military force that has become a major national and transnational nonstate actor. To be sure, this is a loose and dynamic merger subject to many vicissitudes, but the “marriage of convenience” has lasted for several years and appears to be getting stronger.

*The General Response.* Colombia, the United States, and other countries that might ultimately be affected by the destabilizing

consequences of the narco-insurgent-paramilitary nexus in Colombia have tended to deal with the problem in a piecemeal fashion or even to ignore it. For over 40 years, the various Colombian governments dealt with the problem without a strategic-level plan; without adequate or timely intelligence; without a consensus among the political, economic, and military elites about how to deal with the armed opposition; and, importantly, within an environment of mutual enmity between the civil government and the armed forces.<sup>24</sup> With the promulgation of *Plan Colombia* in 2000 and a so-called Defense Strategy in 2003, at least there is the basis of a coherent political project, but not much else.

The United States largely has ignored the insurgent and paramilitary problems in Colombia, except for making rhetorical statements regarding the peace process, terrorist activities, and human rights violations. The United States has focused its money, training, and attention almost entirely on the counter-drug campaign, and has viewed the Colombian crisis in limited tactical and operational terms: the number of hectares of coca eradicated, the number of kilos of coca detected and destroyed, and the number of traffickers jailed. And, even though the United States and Colombia have achieved a series of tactical “successes” in the coca fields, the laboratories, and on the streets, the violent nonstate actors remain strong and become ever more wealthy.<sup>25</sup>

Neighboring countries that are affected by the nefarious activities of Colombia’s Hobbesian Trinity tend to be doing little more than watching and debating about what, if anything, to do about the seemingly new and unknown phenomenon.<sup>26</sup> In the meantime, the fundamental political-social-economic causes and consequences of the Colombian crisis act as continuing stimulants to regional instability and conflict.

*Conclusions.* Strategic victory in any kind of war, including the most likely types of violence on the conflict spectrum, is not simply the sum of the number of “enemies” killed or the number of arrests made during the course of a given conflict. Rather, it is the product of connecting and weighting the various elements of national and international power within the context of strategic appraisals, strategic vision, and strategic-political objectives—as a “purpose built” bridge connecting political, economic, informational, and

military/police power to civil-political goals.<sup>27</sup> In all the years of the Colombian crisis, none of this has been completely understood or achieved.

The narco-terrorist nexus in Colombia has generated a triple threat to the state. First, through murder, kidnapping, intimidation, corruption, and other means of coercion, these violent internal nonstate actors undermine the ability of the government to perform its legitimizing functions. Second, by violently imposing their will over the “democratically elected” government, these actors compromise the exercise of the authority of the state. Third, by taking control of large portions of the national territory, including the people in it, the various components of the narco-terrorist nexus are directly performing the tasks of government and acting as states within a state. Yet, legally and ironically, this set of problems remains a law enforcement issue, not a threat to Colombian national security and sovereignty.

*An Example of the Traditional Approach to National and Regional Security from the Current Central American Case.* An examination of the “New War” in Central America is a good point from which to observe the complexities of contemporary challenges in much of the world. It is also a good example of “spillover” from one place to another. Moreover, contemporary Central America is a case through which to examine the non-utility of the traditional approach in the defense of contemporary stability, security, and sovereignty.

*The General Situation.* Despite high hopes for a “peace dividend” stemming from the ending of the Cold War and the various peace accords of the 1990s that ended the conflicts of the 1980s in Central America, the region has become a prime example of the “new world disorder.”

Today the region’s seven small republics, rather than exhibiting the new harmony and prosperity that were expected to come with peace, bear only the scars and open wounds of traumatized societies: rampant corruption, gang warfare, drug smuggling, intense urban poverty and overpopulation, and neglect from the international community.<sup>28</sup>

*The Destabilizers’ Behavior and Apparent Motives.* As the illegal drug trade has moved north and Central America has become

home to more and more poppy producers, and has become the pipeline for something like 60 percent of the cocaine moving into the United States, that the region is being “Colombianized” is feared. The corruption, violence, and political-economic chaos that have devastated Colombia are now quite evident in all the countries of Central America. As examples, first, the illegal drug trade has created a dangerous synergy between political terror and narco-trafficking, and the line between criminal and political violence is blurring. Second, opportunities for profit and power that the drug trade provides have been exploited by many of the same groups that fought in the insurgency wars of the 1980s. Third, in many cases, law enforcement agencies must confront former colleagues from the security or intelligence services, as well as former insurgents, who have turned to crime. Fourth, in that context, many of these “new criminals” have powerful friends in government and law enforcement entities, and are virtually immune from prosecution. Fifth, as these various players jockey for position, influence, and power, rumors of coups and impending coups have intensified to the point where the OAS passed a resolution on one occasion supporting the rule of Guatemala’s President Portillo.<sup>29</sup> Sixth, general crime rates have increased substantially, and, in addition to having to deal with organized criminal “mafias,” law enforcement organizations must also deal with American-style gangs that have taken control of urban neighborhoods and even entire villages. Seventh, and finally, the drug trade and associated criminal activities move with impunity from one country to another, making destabilizing illegal enterprise a transnational regional as well as a national security and sovereignty issue.

In Central America’s “New War,” it appears that commercial profit is the primary motivation for the various destabilizing and violent activities. Like their narco-terrorist cousins in Colombia, Central American narco-traffickers are not particularly interested in taking *de facto* control of a state. And they are not sending conventional military forces across national borders. They are interested, however, in controlling the regional governments to allow maximum freedom of movement and action within and between national territories. Ample evidence clearly demonstrates

that this kind of commercial motive is, in fact, a political agenda. In that context, effective sovereignty is being seriously challenged in Central America today.

*The General Response.* The Central American governments and the United States have tended to ignore the continuing destabilization of the region. The United States is involved elsewhere, and in the GWOT. Central American governments tend to be too weak and too compromised to act effectively against what Ana Arana calls the “Army of Darkness.”<sup>30</sup> Most local law enforcement agencies are poorly funded and equipped and are unable to deal with the level of criminalization sweeping the region. Moreover, as noted above, police and intelligence organizations must confront former colleagues who—in any case—have powerful friends in current governments. And, artificial sovereignty and long-remembered enmities preclude any serious regional cooperation against those who take advantage of porous political borders for their own nefarious purposes.

At the same time, military response to the surge in crime and violence in Central American has been totally inadequate. Many of the same problems confront the armed forces that plague police organizations—most specifically, lack of resources and corruption. Additionally, because of the generally deep-seated political desire to weaken general military influence and power, the armed forces of the region tend to be focused on traditional external defense only. Some countries are providing military forces for the GWOT in the Middle East, but—in any event—current Central American governments are not prepared to mobilize their various instruments of national and regional power to confront contemporary nontraditional threats to stability, security, and sovereignty. As a consequence, Central America is sliding back into chaos and bloodshed that is vaguely reminiscent of the 1980s.

*Conclusions.* The primary implications of this analysis are clear. The ability of fragile, “besieged,” failing, or failed governments to control, protect, and enhance their stability and well-being is severely threatened in the contemporary global security environment. The conscious choices that individual nation-states and the global community make about how to deal with destabilizing elements in their respective security environments, now and in the future,

will define the process of national reform, regeneration, well-being, and, thus, relative internal and external peace and security. For whatever reasons, shrinking from these inevitable national security requirements for success in contemporary security situations only prolongs and worsens the struggle. Sun Tzu reminds us that, ". . . there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited."<sup>31</sup> The current situation in Central America is a case in point.

Clearly, this is a Central American instability problem that will not and cannot be resolved without strong Central American involvement and *will*. Nevertheless, the United States has significant interests in the region, and could and should be more deeply involved in helping to *strategically-politically* contend with the processes by which states lose the capacity and/or the will to perform their essential governance and security functions. The United States must remember that it shares with its Central American neighbors an increasingly and vitally important financial, commercial, and security/stability stake in the political and economic growth of the hemisphere. Any further political-economic-social-security deterioration in the region will affect the health of the U.S. economy profoundly—and the concomitant power to act in the global security arena.

### **Some Additional Implications for the Levels of Analysis Problem.**

The linkages among security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty illustrate strong interdependence and focus on the idea that although the contemporary security environment is political, economic, and socio-psychological, it can also be violent. In these terms, no successful security strategy or policy can be formulated that does not explicitly and implicitly take into account all the elements that link security to sovereignty. Thus, global, national, and intra-national security will depend on a balanced combination of internal and external political-diplomatic, socio-economic, moral-psychological, and military-police activities. At the same time, as important and compelling as the specific causes and consequences of national and global instability might be, they

must be understood and dealt with on two general levels—the tactical-operational level and the strategic-political level. Experience demonstrates that ignoring an instability problem or only providing a tactical-operational level response to it can be debilitating. In short, for ultimate success, tactical-operational efforts must be coupled and coordinated with strategic-political responses.<sup>32</sup>

Basic critical points concerning the linkage between security and sovereignty must be understood on four different planes.<sup>33</sup> First, leaders around the world are now discussing these issues in terms of the structural-organizational and political-military reforms required to deal more effectively with the “new” security problems that were submerged in the morass of the East-West conflict and unleashed by the Eastern European and Soviet Revolutions of 1989. Yet, strategic theory and maximization of political opportunity (the strategic-political approach) have thus far played little part in that discussion. This is a lamentable situation because effectiveness in any security environment must be preceded by a strategic-political vision, and a cooperative civil-military effort derived from a macro analysis of a given situation.

Second, in that connection, despite the obvious differences between the organizations, tactics, motives, and objectives of the various elements that constitute threats to stability, security, and effective sovereignty, all have one thing in common. They are engaged in what the OAS has defined as grave common crime. This situation, however, is more than a complex law enforcement problem. The threat posed by nonstate and nontraditional human destabilizers is too great and too complex for civilian institutions to confront by themselves. Likewise, it is too great and too complex for military institutions to combat by themselves. Resolving the problem requires a total unity of effort using all the instruments of national and international power. As a corollary, the military and other security organizations must be properly organized, trained, and equipped—and their operational roles must be carefully limited and controlled by legitimate democratic regimes.

Third, the task, within that context of change and reform, is to mount a coherent political-economic-psychological-humanitarian-security effort to create internal and external conditions that can lead

to maintaining and enhancing peace and stability with justice. Thus, national and international security will depend not so much on traditional military-police law enforcement activities at the tactical-operational level as on global and domestic strategies and policies on the strategic-political level, which provide for the strengthening of the state in terms of political reform and competence, socio-economic development, and personal and collective security. This, in turn, adds up to legitimate governance. Thus, the highest priority for a besieged government struggling against the forces of instability must be to strengthen and legitimize the state.

Fourth, as a result, every policy, every program, and every action of a “besieged” or failing state and its external allies must contribute *directly* and positively to developing, maintaining, and enhancing the ability and willingness of the associated government to exercise effective sovereignty by controlling its territory and governing its people in a responsible and morally acceptable manner. We must remember that attacking “nodes of vulnerability,” providing short-term cosmetic and tactical-operational solutions to an instability-related threat can be ineffective or even counterproductive. Nodes of vulnerability are just that—they are not strategic centers of gravity. Short-term and cosmetic solutions are just that—short-term and cosmetic. This takes us back to the strategic-political issue of legitimate governance. The wisdom of Sun Tzu is relevant. He argues, “Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their governments invincible.”<sup>34</sup> The implication is clear: a decision that the necessary balance of political, economic, psychological, and security actions required to address this societal requirement is “too hard” will implicitly result in a final decision for failure.

### **The Ultimate Threat—State Failure.**

Thus, civilian and military leaders today must understand the force of the arguments made by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay that flow through *The Federalist Papers*. That is, the price of peace is justice, the price of justice is the rule of law, the price of law is

government, the price of government is stability and order, and, finally, government must apply to all men and women within a polity, not merely to those who are overtly willing to accept a given regime.<sup>35</sup> In that connection, probably the most insidious security problem facing the world and the nations in it today centers on the threats to a given nation-state's ability and willingness to control: 1) control the national territory and the people in it fairly and justly; and 2) internal factions or nonstate actors seeking violent change within the borders of the nation-state.

The traditional problem of external aggression retains credibility, but not the urgency it once had. For sovereignty to be meaningful today, the state and its associated government, working under the rule of law, must be the only source of authority empowered to make and enforce laws and conduct the business of the people within the national territory. The violent, intimidating, and corrupting activities of illegal internal and transnational nonstate actors can abridge or negate these powers.<sup>36</sup> At base, this is a major personal and collective security issue. That, in turn, is a governance issue.

Probably the most fundamental societal requirement regarding governance is that of security. Personal and collective security, in turn, are the primary bases upon which all forms of societal acceptance and allegiance to the state are built. John Locke reminds us that, in addition to being subjected by a foreign power,

There is one way more whereby a government may be dissolved, and that is, when he who has the supreme executive power neglects and abandons that charge [to provide governance and concomitant security], so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government.<sup>37</sup>

The primary implication of the complex and ambiguous situations described here is straightforward. The contemporary, chaotic global strategic environment reflects a general lack of legitimate governance and civil-military cooperation in many parts of the world. Instability thrives under those conditions. Instability, violence, terrorism, and criminal anarchy are the general consequences of unreformed political, social, economic, and security institutions and concomitant

misguided governance.<sup>38</sup> Thus, inept governance is the root cause and the central strategic problem in the current unstable security arena. Governments, international organizations, transnational entities, and other symbols of global power that have not responded to the importance of the general legitimate governance requirement often find themselves in a “crisis of governance.” Ultimately, this instability—along with the human destabilizers who exploit it—lead to a final downward spiral into failing and failed state status.<sup>39</sup>

## **Why State Failure Matters.**

The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade. They spawn all kinds of things we do not like such as human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, they usually are unconfined and “spill-over” into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.<sup>40</sup>

Additionally, failing and failed states simply do not go away. Ample evidence demonstrates that failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, “rogue states,” criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. Moreover, failing and failed states tend not to (1) buy U.S. and other Western-made products, (2) be interested in developing democratic and free market institutions and human rights, or (3) cooperate on shared problems such as illegal drugs, illicit arms flows, debilitating refugee flows, and potentially dangerous environmental problems. In short, the longer they persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.<sup>41</sup>

## PART TWO: COMPLETING THE ARGUMENT FOR BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

This section builds on the concepts and lessons noted above and completes the argument for broadening the concept of national security. To finalize the argument supporting the idea of broadening the notion of security, we elaborate on 1) change in the global security environment, 2) the primary problems of the contemporary security arena, and 3) the resultant transformation of contemporary conflict.

### **Change in the Security Environment.**

A global revolution has been taking place since the end of the Cold War. Global political violence is clashing with global economic integration. As in all revolutions, fundamental change is the primary defining factor. At the same time, old versus new elements of society are coming into conflict with each other, and old versus new shifts of wealth and power are conflicting with each other. And, more often than not, the causes and consequences of the resultant instabilities tend to be exploited by powerful and not-so-powerful destabilizers for their own narrow, commercial, and ideological purposes. The intent is to impose self-determined desires for “change” on a society, nation-state, and/or other perceived symbols of power in the global community—and, perhaps, to revert to the questionable glories of the 12th century. This new world security environment and the confusion and chaos that accompany it are essentially the products of a lack of consensus as to how to deal with the current situation. Thus, we have the privilege of contemplating a world that is more and more unified economically and increasingly divided by the pathological claims of opposed ideologies, nationalisms, and commercial motivations. We see these problems of change in the following six ways.<sup>42</sup>

First, the one constant in world politics that virtually guarantees change is that of global anarchy. As noted above, nothing checks the vicissitudes of the modern sovereign nation-state or any other

global political actor except the power of other actors. At the same time, the independent traditional or nontraditional political actor defines what is right and wrong and good and bad in terms of his own perceived interests. The resultant security environment cannot possibly be predictable or benign.

Second, despite there being one global superpower, the world is becoming more and more multipolar and dangerous. In addition to the United States and some other well-known international actors, several little noticed regional powers are emerging as effective players in the global security arena. At the same time, the various poles exert different types and levels of effectiveness of power: military (e.g., the United States); economic/financial (e.g., Germany, Japan, Asian “tigers”); demographic (e.g., India, China, Brazil, Mexico); and terrorist/asymmetrical (e.g., al Qaida, drug lords, *Sendero Luminoso*, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and criminal anarchists). Moreover, psychological opinion-making power and bond-relationship targeting belong to any state or nonstate actor willing and able to gain access to the mass media and to engage in cyber or net war. Its effectiveness is limited only by the imaginative and quantitative efforts of any given individual political actor. As another example, information campaigns using the internet have been key to the political-strategic successes of the *Zapatista* insurgency in Mexico.

Third, the problems of governance and the failure of states constitute another kind of change in the global milieu. More than half the countries of the world have been brought to the point of economic and political collapse by corrupt and/or incompetent leadership.<sup>43</sup> The gravity of the problem is hard to exaggerate. As examples, however, hundreds of thousands of people have voted with their proverbial feet and have been emigrating, creating new problems as refugees in other countries. Hundreds of thousands have become a part of the illicit drug industry. Those millions of people who have been unable to leave their countries or otherwise improve their lives through involvement in the black or gray economies tend to isolate themselves mentally from their governments. Others become revolutionaries, or criminal anarchists, or at least tacit supporters of those who promise change. In most of the poorly governed and

impoverished countries of the world, not many people remain with the necessary skills who are willing to provide their time, treasure, and blood to serve the state. The resultant susceptibility to upheaval and instability can only benefit new as well as established enemies.

Nonetheless, we must remember that, as important as instability might be in a national or transnational threat environment, it is only a symptom—not the threat itself. Rather, the ultimate threat is “state failure” and stems from a failure to alleviate the various manifestations of political, economic, and social injustices that are the root causes of instability. A related threat stems from a failure to deal properly with the conflicts that are the consequences of instability. Clearly, the central strategic problem is the challenge to the government’s moral right to govern. The basis for the challenge is the perception that the current regime is not providing or cannot provide the necessary stability, development, freedom, and security that the peoples of a targeted nation-state want and need. In that context, we can argue that a given human destabilizer’s political philosophy and system represent relatively better ways and means of achieving those goals.

Fifth, the lessons of the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi War, and the hundreds of other conflicts that have taken place since the end of World War II are not being lost on the new powers emerging into the contemporary multipolar international security arena. Ironically, strategies being developed to protect or further the interests of a number of traditional and nontraditional political actors are inspired by the dual idea of evading and frustrating superior conventional military or police force. The better a government has become at the operational level of conventional war or law-enforcement, the more a potential external or internal state or nonstate opponent has turned to the more political-psychological types of conflict that are being called asymmetric or “knowledge-based” warfare. B. H. Liddell-Hart saw all this in the early 1960s. Thus, the concepts of conventional attrition and maneuver warfare are being superseded by that of “camouflaged war.”<sup>44</sup> Normally, the primary aim of such a war is to politically and psychologically gain control of a population or government, not simply gain some sort of limited concession. As a consequence, the stakes in these conflicts are total from the standpoint of both the eventual winners and losers.

Sixth, the political-psychological issues of contemporary change in the global security environment translate into constant subtle and not-so-subtle struggles for governmental power that dominate life throughout much of the world today. This, in turn, leads to the slow but sure destruction of the state, its associated government, and the society. And, again, the basic threat devolves to that of state failure.

## **A Closer Look at the Primary Problems in the Contemporary Security Arena.**

The lessons from a half-century of bitter experience suffered by governments and peoples involved in contemporary conflict show that struggles against all forms of asymmetric warfare often fail. This is because these are, at base, essentially strategic-political governance problems. The easier, cheaper, and more manageable “symptomatic” tactical approach generally leads nowhere, and ends in political failure.<sup>45</sup>

*Responsible Governance.* In this context, it is important to remember four things.<sup>46</sup> First, state failure is a process, not an outcome. It is a process by which the state loses the capacity and/or the will to perform its essential governance and security functions. At the same time, it may be a process by which the state never developed those capabilities in the first place.

Second, if we focus only on the capacity to govern, we may lose sight of the fact that the state and its institutions may lack effective legitimacy. Haiti, North Korea, Taliban Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq illustrate this point. History shows that individuals and groups can frequently prop-up the capacity of the state to govern through the use of sheer force and “state terrorism.” However, the inherent weakness in the lack of governmental legitimacy will likely lead to the eventual erosion of its authority, and to a process of state failure.

Third, a tendency resulting from the focus on state failure has been to concentrate attention on state collapse; that is, the so-called “failed state.” To be effective, however, we must address the processes of state failure before they begin and certainly while they are underway—not simply when they have already run their courses and have achieved crisis proportions.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, responsible governance concerns the manner of governing rather than the fact of governing or the legal international recognition that a given regime represents a sovereign state. Thus, responsible and legitimate governance is defined as governance that derives its just powers from the consent of the governed and generates a viable political competence that can and will manage, coordinate, and sustain security; social harmony; social, economic, and political development; and stability.<sup>47</sup> These are the necessary fundamental elements that define the “social contract” between a people and their government and give a regime the moral right to govern. These are also the very pragmatic foundations for national and global well-being and stability.

*The Road to Political Failure.* As noted above, the thread that permits human destabilizers to develop, grow, and succeed is adequate freedom of action over time. These individuals and groups attempt to maintain their freedom of action through appropriate security systems and measures such as establishing remote base areas and sanctuaries, using multiple and secret routes, developing supporting underground infrastructure, and prelocating arms and food caches. Other measures include infiltrating government and social organizations for intelligence and political purposes and for recruiting popular support (whether willing, bribed, or intimidated). Simultaneously, an attempt is made to enhance freedom of action and security through direct actions that distract and disburse security forces and correspondingly weaken the incumbent government. These include deliberate acts of terror against key individuals and institutions associated with governance, military attacks against symbols of central government authority, such as weak police or military installations, and the physical destruction of a country’s economic infrastructure.

Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso* calls activities that facilitate the processes of state failure and generate greater freedom of movement and action “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating in the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their causes, *Sendero’s* and other violent nonstate actors’ armed propaganda and business incentives are aimed at

lessening a regime's credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and its populace. An example of *Sendero*'s objectives is instructive.<sup>48</sup> At the strategic level, *Sendero Luminoso* is taking a low military profile, increasing sabotage and terrorism, and waiting for the time when its interior bases of support are well enough reconstituted to make serious attacks upon the capital city of Lima feasible. The intent, now—similar to what it was in the past—is to reestablish its infrastructure and refocus its primary attack psychologically on the Peruvian government's right and ability to govern.

At the operational level, *Sendero* is currently on the offensive. Doctrinally and in dialectical terms, other antithetical activities generally considered "defensive" in nature are also pursued in the "offensive" at all levels. As examples, *Sendero* continues to develop cadres to man the expanding political, military, and support components of the movement; to maintain psychological and organizational efforts with the "masses"; and to consolidate its position in Peru's interior and poor districts of the major cities. The thesis in *Sendero*'s offensive strategy at the operational level includes—first and foremost—"armed propaganda." The primary purpose of this part of the "armed struggle" is to convince the Peruvian people that *Sendero Luminoso* is and will be the real power in the country.

Tactically, *Sendero* operates in small units with political, psychological, and military objectives—in that order. Examples of these activities include assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism, destruction of transportation and communications nets, and reconstitution of its bases for the reestablishment of control and governance within specific areas. *Sendero* will continue to jab and probe and enforce its will against carefully selected targets, but there will be no direct confrontations with the armed forces on any large scale. The strategic-political objective to which tactical operations must contribute is to bring into question the ability and moral right of an elitist, foreign-dominated, and non-Indian minority regime to govern the country. The intent of these activities is to lessen regime credibility and to show the country that—even after its initial defeat—*Sendero* is still working to provide the freedom of

revolutionary movement that is necessary to take power—and to create a “nationalistic,” “Indian,” “popular,” and “truly Peruvian” democracy.<sup>49</sup>

Experience shows that, if carefully done, the long-term combined use of indirect moral-psychological influences, organizational development, viable security measures, and direct violence techniques can eventually undermine the position and legitimacy of other political actors by breaking the bonds uniting a people, its political leadership, and its protective security organizations. These “persuasive and coercive” political activities cannot be considered simple legal and, therefore, solely law enforcement problems. They are real and substantive threats to national security and sovereignty, and they must be addressed as such.<sup>50</sup>

## **The Transformation of Conflict.**

To understand contemporary warfare as it operates within the global security environment, it is important to understand the transformation of conflict. In these terms, then, we must examine 1) the strategic-political types of war, and 2) the difference between military victory and strategic victory.

*Strategic-Political Types of War.* Metz and Millen assert that four distinct but interrelated dominant strategic battlespaces exist. They are 1) direct interstate war, 2) nonstate war, 3) intrastate war, and 4) indirect interstate war.<sup>51</sup> Direct interstate war is the traditional and conventional type of war, but is declining in frequency. Nonstate war involves criminal and terrorist actors that thrive among various host states and use information technology for funding, intelligence, internal communication, and command and control, and use terrorist and insurgency methods to maintain freedom of movement and their own security. The al Qaida terrorist network is an example. Institutionalized criminality in West Africa is another. Intrastate war involves a conflict between a state and nonstate actors, such as insurgents or separatists, or a conflict between two or more nonstate actors. A classical example of this phenomenon is the conflict between and among the state, FARC, ELN, AUC, and narco-traffickers in Colombia. Indirect interstate war entails aggression by

a state through proxies. Serbia's support of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs is also illustrative.

Logic would dictate that military transition, to ensure dominance, must adopt two parallel tracks: one aimed at direct interstate war and the other aimed at nonstate war, indirect interstate war, and intrastate war. But, as General Sir Frank Kitson argues, these tracks should not be considered as independent forms of warfare. They are parts within the concept of total war.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, two other points are worth serious consideration. First, the various types of warfare do not always follow each other in ascending or descending order. They often overlap in terms of time and place, so that it is possible to have insurgency and conventional war going on at the same time. Second, although many countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, prefer to use police or other civil entities rather than the military to counter "nonmilitary" or "nonlethal" threats in any of the forms of war, that does not mean that these types of threats are any less a manifestation of war than direct interstate war. As a consequence, it is important to consider and prepare for "warfare as a whole."<sup>53</sup>

Contemporary conflict is not a kind of appendage, a lesser or limited thing, to the comfortable vision of conventional war. Contemporary conflict is a great deal more. As long as opposition exists that is willing to risk everything violently to depose a government, destroy a society, or cause great harm to a society—there is war. This is a zero-sum game in which there can only be one winner, or, perhaps, no winner. It is, thus, total. And, as a consequence, it must be considered and implemented as a whole. Today and in the future, confrontation between belligerents is transformed from the level of military violence to the level of a multidimensional struggle for the proverbial "hearts and minds" of a people. Within the context of people being the ultimate center of gravity, antagonists can strive to achieve the Clausewitzian admonition to "dare to win all"—the complete political overthrow of a government or another symbol of power—instead of "using superior strength to filch some province."<sup>54</sup>

*Military Victory and Strategic Victory.* In connection with the idea of warfare as a whole, the military role goes beyond traditional war-

fighting to nontraditional conflict—and to help consolidate success by providing security and support to partners, other government agencies, and nongovernmental agencies in the aftermath. In these terms, military forces provide the capabilities needed to consolidate battlefield success and turn it into strategic victory. Thus, strategic victory requires not only the defeat of an enemy military force, but often occupation and a multiagency effort to change the society, culture, economy, and political system that undergirded the aggression that brought on the crisis in the first place.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, history is replete with instances when military victory did not lead to strategic success, and military and civilian leaders complained that they had “won” militarily but had “lost” politically—as if there were no connection. The French experience in Algeria, the U.S. experience in Vietnam, and recent coalition experiences in the Gulf War and the Iraqi War immediately come to mind. In Vietnam, as an example, U.S. civilian and military leaders thought that “kicking ass” and destroying the enemy military force “dressed in black pajamas” was the goal of policy. A “limited war,” such as that in Vietnam, implied that it was a low-effort task unworthy of serious concern, and was something to be conducted with complaisance. It, thus, became a traditional war of attrition “writ small.”<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, the threat in Vietnam was not a limited or traditional one. Rather, below the level of U.S. consciousness, generated by their “armed propaganda,” other shows of force, and spectacular actions like the Tet Offensive, the “enemy”—dressed in their comical black pajamas—were making unconventional persuasive and intimidating preparations to take control of the state.<sup>57</sup> Colonel Harry G. Summers takes this issue to its logical conclusion in the following account of a conversation that took place in Hanoi in April 1975, “‘You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,’ said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. ‘That may be so,’ he replied, ‘but it is also irrelevant.’”<sup>58</sup>

In the contemporary security environment, international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, and the OAS, and individual national powers are increasingly called on to respond to conflicts generated by all kinds of instabilities and destabilizers. Furthermore, the international community is increasingly expected to provide the

leverage to ensure that legitimate governance—once regained—is given to responsible, incorrupt, and competent leadership that can and will address the political, economic, and social root causes that created the crisis and intervention.<sup>59</sup> Thus, to paraphrase the clear logic of Metz and Millen again, the capability to attain strategic victory will be even more important in the emerging security environment than it was in the past.<sup>60</sup>

## PART THREE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

If there is one theme that stands out in this monograph, it is that understanding and dealing with the problems of effective security, stability, and sovereignty in the current global security environment requires a wide-ranging understanding and application of the strategic-political levels of threats and analysis that cumulatively lead either to state success or failure. By coming to grips analytically and practically with the salient realities that dominate contemporary nonconventional conflict, Western Hemisphere political and military leaders should be able to maximize global opportunities and establish an effective collective security regime for the region.

All the countries of the hemisphere have vested national security interests in helping to reverse the current instability, insecurity, and ineffective sovereignty, and replace them with positive security, moderation, cooperation, stability, well-being, and effective sovereignty. Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the threat—and no agreement on a strategic-political ends, ways, and means policy and strategy to achieve the common hemispheric security-stability interests. As it stands now, the United States and its hemispheric partners are working together, separately, to achieve some level of national and regional security in the Americas. The result is neither evolution nor devolution toward or away from that objective. There is an impasse.

### **The Bottom Line.**

The bottom line is that a unifying and realistic common agenda for Western Hemisphere security is needed. But, before the United States unilaterally initiates “building blocks” based on the Rio

Treaty to implement a “common agenda,” before proposals for standing military and naval forces for the hemisphere are initiated by such countries as Argentina and Chile,<sup>61</sup> and before the OAS is embarrassed into producing some sort of ad hoc security architecture to confront the current and future security environment; a few fundamental problems and reforms must be addressed.

*The Basics.* Hemispheric governments, their U.S. ally, and the supporting international community must do three things to begin to accomplish the fundamental task of regaining control of national territory and ensuring the cycle of meaningful security to effective sovereignty. First, together, they must help individual nation-states to strengthen and legitimize themselves. This means promulgating fundamental political, economic, and social reforms—and resolving the civil-military relations issue. Second, they must help professionalize and modernize national security forces and judicial systems to the point where they can enforce—under strong legitimate civilian control—the rule of law fairly and effectively. Third, strong legitimate hemispheric governments must professionalize and modernize their security institutions to a level where they have the capability to neutralize and/or destroy all illegal perpetrators of violence and instability—regardless of label.

Solutions to these problems require the highest level of strategic-political thought, and exceptional civil-military and military-military diplomacy, cooperation, and coordination. Solutions to these problems take the United States beyond unilateral training and equipping units for conducting tactical-operational level counternarcotics and counterterrorist operations to multilateral strategic-political approaches to broader professional military education (PME) and leader development, and organization for unity of effort.

As stated explicitly and implicitly throughout this monograph, these concepts must also go beyond the traditional-legal definition of national security and overcome its external orientation and conventional military bias. Yet, they must remain firmly rooted in the realistic political-military-strategic realm while being sensitive to political, economic, psychological, and social variables that have an impact on security and sovereignty. Importantly, these concepts

can provide a point of departure from which allies and friends might advance the understanding—and implementation—of an appropriate common security agenda. The recommended basic direction for such efforts is beyond the scope of this monograph, but the sooner it is elaborated, the better.

*The Most Fundamental Requirement.* The realities of the global security environment and the fundamental tasks of reform and regeneration call for nothing less than a paradigm change. The primary challenge, then, is to come to terms with the fact that contemporary security, at whatever level, is at its base a holistic and long-term, strategic-political level, civil-military effort to preserve individual and collective security and stability. The corollary is to change from a singular tactical-operational level military or law enforcement approach to a multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational strategic-political paradigm that addresses the legitimate and meaningful preservation of the state. That, in turn, requires a conceptual framework, and an organizational structure to promulgate unified civil-military planning and implementation of the multidimensional concept.

## **Conclusion.**

Implementing the conceptual change and regeneration implied in this call for a paradigm shift will not be easy. That will, nevertheless, be far less demanding and costly in political, military, monetary, and ethical terms than to continue a traditional, generally military, tactical-operational level crisis management approach to contemporary global security. And, importantly, the alternative cannot be acceptable. This is not simple idealism. It is a marriage of (North) American pragmatism and *realpolitik* that provides a viable foundation for national, regional, and global stability and well-being.

## **PART FOUR: AFTERWORD**

In light of the dynamics of the new world security environment, there is ample reason for worldwide concern. The traditional-legal level of analysis focuses on the short-term, tactical-operational,

micro-level issues that have proved insufficient to deal with the complex political-psychological problems of globalism. Experience indicates that instability and the people who create and/or exploit it are tactical-operational threats in their own rights. But, the ultimate political-strategic threat to more general hemispheric and global security and sovereignty is state failure.

As a consequence, a broadened concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful and important. This is particularly important for those governments in the Western Hemisphere—and elsewhere—that to not discern any serious security issues, or proverbial clouds, on their traditionally-defined peaceful horizons. Ample evidence, again, indicates that nontraditional security problems can take nation-states to a process that ends in failing or failed state status. That is to say, as examples, dysfunctional states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new “Peoples’ Democracies.” Moreover, it is important to note that failing and failed states tend not to 1) buy U.S. and other Western-made products, 2) be interested in developing democratic and free market institutions and human rights, and 3) cooperate on shared problems such as illegal drugs, illicit arms flows and weapons of mass destruction, debilitating refugee flows, and potentially dangerous environmental problems (e.g., conflict over water scarcity). In short, failing and failed states tend to linger, and go from bad to worse. The longer they persist, the more they and their “spillover” problems endanger regional and global peace and security.

This situation is extremely volatile and dangerous, and requires careful attention. In these terms, the United States, the rest of the hemisphere, and the rest of the global community must understand and cope with the threat imposed by diverse actors engaged in destabilizing and devastating violence that is more and more often being called “terrorism.” If the United States continues to concentrate its efforts and resources elsewhere and ignores what is happening in Latin America and the Caribbean—and that is likely to happen without the implementation of the strategic reforms recommended in this monograph—the expansion of terrorism, the expansion of “lawless areas,” the expansion of general instability, and the compromise of effective national sovereignty could easily

destroy the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that have been achieved in recent years. In turn, that would profoundly affect the health of the U.S. economy—and the concomitant power to act in the global security arena.

## ENDNOTES

1. Consensus statement from the Conference on “Building Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere,” co-sponsored by the North-South Center of the University of Miami and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, in Miami, FL, March 1-2, 2003.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.* Also see Organization of American States, *Draft Declaration on Security in the Americas*, approved by the Permanent Council, October 22, 2003.

5. *Ibid.*

6. As an example of this discussion, see Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, 5th ed., Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 3-46; and Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, pp. 7-8. Also, these terms are developed in Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 24-25, 143-330; and Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., *National Security and American Society*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973, p. 47.

7. Daniel C. Esty, *et. al.*, “The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning,” in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

8. To be fair, it must be noted that some scholars and journalists are beginning to understand this problem and are writing in these terms. See, as three examples, Anthony T. Bryan, *Transnational Organized Crime: The Caribbean Context*, Miami: The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 2002; Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; and “El delito como una amenaza geopolítica,” in *Clarín.com*, 3 de Julio de 2003. Related International Relations theory may be found in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*,

2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997; and Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Krause and Williams, pp. 121-146.

9. While it does not show many of the problems that Kaplan points up, one published map does emphasize this particular point. See "World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2001/2002"; Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy."

10. Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, p. 3; Trager and Kronenberg; Schoultz, pp. 143-330.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. General Michael P. C. Carns, "Reopening the Deterrence Debate: Thinking about a Peaceful and Prosperous Tomorrow," in *Deterrence in the 21st Century*, Max G. Manwaring, ed., London: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 8.

14. Organization of American States, *Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism*, AG/RES. 1840, adopted at the second plenary session held on June 3, 2002.

15. *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2001.

16. These assertions are derived from statistical tests based on interviews with several hundred civilian and military officials and scholars with direct experience in approximately 100 internal conflicts. The effort originally was mandated by Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Maxwell Thurman during 1984-1986. It was subsequently taken up by others and continues to be updated. The resultant statistical model predicts at an impressive 88.37 percent of the cases examined and is statistically significant at the .001 level. The model, originally called SSI 1 and SSI 2, has also been called the SWORD model. The SWORD papers, although long out of print, are archived in their entirety by a private research organization, the National Security Archives, in Washington, DC Hereafter cited as Interviews.

17. A classic book on relatively recent Colombian violence is Vernon Lee Fluherty, *Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930-1956*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957. Also see Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., *Colombia: A Country Study*, Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990; Luis Alberto Restrepo, "The Crisis of the Current Political Regime and Its Possible Outcomes," in *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, Charles Bergquist,

Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez, eds., *Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1992*, pp. 273-292; Angel Rabassa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, pp. 39-60; Eduardo Pizarro, "Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia," in Bergquist, Penaranda, and Sanchez, eds., pp. 169-193; and Hal Klepak, "Colombia: Why Doesn't the War End?" *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 2000, pp. 41-45.

18. This term was coined by Joseph R. Nuñez in *Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

19. Interviews conducted with Colombian civilian and military officials, 2000-2003.

20. Michael Shifter, *Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue, 2000, pp. viii, 1-2, 18.

21. Interviews.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.* Also see Angel Rabassa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, pp. 39-60; and David Spencer, *Colombia's Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Force?* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

24. Interviews. Also see Dennis M. Rempe, *The Past as Prologue: A History of U.S. Counter-Insurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66*, Carlisle Bks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

25. Interviews. Also see Max Manwaring, "U.S. Too Narrowly Focused on Drug War in Colombia," *The Miami Herald*, August 15, 2001.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.* Also see Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 1-15.

28. This and the following statements regarding the Central American case come from Ana Arana, "The New Battle for Central America," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2001, pp. 88-101.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 73.

32. Interviews.

33. These assertions are derived from Interviews.

34. Sun Tzu, p. 88.

35. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, New York: Mentor, 1961.

36. *Ibid.*

37. John Locke, *Of Civil Government, Second Treatise Of Civil Government*, New York: Gateway, n.d., p. 159.

38. Daniel C. Esty, *et. al.*, pp. 27-38. Also see Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 138-168.

39. *Ibid.*

40. Robert H. Dorff, "Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Search for Strategy," in Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff, *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 127-140.

41. *Ibid.*

42. The following assertions stem from Interviews.

43. After Kaplan, Jessica T. Mathews was one of the first to acknowledge this problem. Ana Arana is one of the most recent. See Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1997, pp. 50-66; and Ana Arana.

44. B. H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed., New York: Signet, 1974, p. 367.

45. Esty; and Interviews.

46. These assertions are derived from Dorff.

47. *Ibid.*; and Interviews.

48. See Abimael Guzmán, "El Discurso del Dr. Guzmán," in *Los partidos políticos en el Perú*, ed., Rogger Mercado U., Lima, Perú: Ediciones Latinoamericanos, 1985, pp. 85-90; Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, *Desarrollar la Guerra popular sirviendo a la revolución mundial*, Lima: Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, 1986, pp. 82-88; Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, *Bases de discusión*, Lima: Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, 1987; "El documento oficial de Sendero," in Mercado,; *Interview with Chairman Gonzolo*, San Francisco, CA: Red Banner Editorial House, 1988; Simon Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru*, New York: Random House, 1992, pp. 225-231; and Simon Strong, *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism*, No. 260, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, April 1993, pp. 1-2; 23-26. Also see Interviews.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Interviews.

51. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. ix, 15-17.

52. Frank Kitson, *Warfare as a Whole*, London: Faber and Faber, 1987.

53. *Ibid.*

54. Clausewitz, p. 596.

55. Metz and Millin, pp. x, 22-23.

56. Interviews. Also see as one example, Eric M. Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

57. *Ibid.*, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, *Peoples' War, Peoples' Army*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, pp. 34-36; Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972; Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1972. Also see Interviews.

58. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1983, p. 1.

59. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Global Leadership After the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, pp. 86-98; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations, 1992, pp. 11, 32-34.

60. Metz and Millen.

61. This is based on a statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, at the Defense Ministerial of the Americas, Santiago, Chile, November 19, 2002, reported by the U.S. Department of State's Office of International Informational Programs.